Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group by Goodland, Robert
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 4
Issue 2 Summer 2004: Prior Informed Consent Article 13
Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World
Bank Group
Robert Goodland
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Human Rights
Law Commons, International Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goodland, Robert. "Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group."Sustainable Development Law and Policy, Summer
2004, 66-74.
66SUMMER 2004 
FROM PARTICIPATION TO CONSENT
Community participation1 is part of the trust-buildingprocess necessary for developers to earn a social licenseto operate and is a standard component of corporate
social responsibility.  The World Bank Group (“WBG”) now
requires meaningful participation.  Effective participation
means agreement on precautions, mitigation, and compensation.
The distribution of benefits between the developer, local and
central government, and affected communities is also a central
element of participation. This process starts well before permit-
ting and licensing, and leads to public acceptance and consent. 
“Meaningful participation” if properly implemented, can
achieve free, prior informed consent.  However, the term “mean-
ingful participation” is open to various interpretations, depend-
ing on who is managing the participation.2 While the WBG
requires meaningful participation, the Bank has not completely
implemented actual consent as a prerequisite to all projects.
FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
Free, prior informed consent (“FPIC”), here abbreviated to
“consent”, is a process to improve development.  While not per-
fect, FPIC is a vast improvement on using force in development
or imposing involuntary conditions on impacted people.
Consent provides potentially impacted communities with infor-
mation about a proposed development and fosters their consent.
It begins with the provision of details on the nature of a pro-
posed action, as well as the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the
proposed action.  FPIC can be a process to protect consumers by
providing relevant information for them to make informed
choices, and it is a tool to provide developers with a “social
license” to operate.  The FPIC process is the main means of
ensuring that potentially affected communities have all neces-
sary information at their disposal in order to negotiate on equal
terms with project proponents.  Balanced negotiation demands
education of stakeholders (governments, proponents, affected
communities) on their rights and responsibilities. Such negotia-
tions between asymmetrical parties usually need advocates,
facilitators, and technical assistance.
FPIC requires affected communities to agree to a project
before it goes ahead.  The seeds for this position have been grad-
ually strengthening since the early 1980s, when there was the
first international acceptance of the idea that displacement of
people should not go ahead if the potentially affected communi-
ties found it unacceptable.  The goal is that all displacement
should be so attractive that it would be entirely voluntary; “gen-
eral acceptance” would be the norm.  Oustees would become
project beneficiaries.  
According to the concept of FPIC, any form of develop-
ment that depends on the use of force, involuntary action, and
increasing poverty has become unacceptable.  The form of
development must change so that it is consensual and demo-
cratic. If there is significant broad-based opposition, a project is
likely to fail.  Consequently, development projects, such as
reservoirs in densely populated farmland that depend on mass
involuntary displacement3, should be redesigned.  Alternatively,
FPIC might be achieved by guaranteeing benefits to the impact-
ed communities through insurance, performance bonds, or
escrowed trust funds.
In the mid-1990s, the WBG ruled that “meaningful consul-
tation” must be interpreted as the possibility of saying no. With
the veto power comes the correlative power to negotiate on
equal terms with the project proponent.  This does not mean a
single obdurate family can cancel a project; eminent domain
should remain available for such cases, but resorted to only
sparingly.
FPIC helps the poor more than the rich, who usually are not
pressured into accepting potentially harmful actions, partly
because the rich have more power.  The poor tend to accept
riskier jobs and less safe labor conditions, and may provide con-
sent more readily than the rich because of need.  Therefore, even
though consent is a necessary condition for a development proj-
ect to be permitted, it may not be sufficient.
HISTORY OF FPIC
THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND “MEANINGFUL
CONSULTATION”
Giving consideration to people affected by development is
a relatively new process.  In the 1950s and 1960s, people poten-
tially harmed by a project might be warned, but rarely helped.
“You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs” was often
heard, even within the WBG.  By the late 1980s, though, “mean-
ingful consultation” became mandatory in WBG-assisted proj-
ects.  Meaningful stakeholder participation became mandatory
in 1992.  The WBG’s Legal Department interpreted the term
“meaningful” to mean that the communities being consulted had
a right to say “no” to the proposal.  Consultation and participa-
tion ring hollow if the potentially affected communities can say
anything except “no”.  
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CODIFICATIONS OF FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
One of the earliest formal codifications of FPIC was in the
Nuremberg Code of 1947 concerning the conditions under which
research and experimentation could be carried out on human
beings.  Consent is still intensively discussed in the field of med-
ical ethics.  The International Bill of Rights, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights all clearly
provide for self-determination and free pursuit of people’s own
development4.  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) and United Nations systems have
increasingly relied on consent.  The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples explicitly recognize FPIC.  The UN
International Labor Organization’s (“ILO”) Convention 169 pro-
vides for free prior informed consent in cases of displacement.
The UN Food and Agricultural Organization’s (“FAO”) Code of
Conduct was amended in 1989 to make consent mandatory. The
1989 Basel Convention on hazardous wastes, the 2001 Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (“POPs”), and the
2002 Convention on Biological Diversity all contain strict FPIC
requirements. The Rotterdam Convention on Free Prior Informed
Consent was adopted in 1998.  Consent has long been a require-
ment for indigenous peoples who may potentially be impacted by
a development project.5
CHARACTERISTICS OF FPIC
The main characteristics of FPIC are that it is: (1) freely
given; (2) fully informed; (3) obtained before permission is
granted to a proponent to proceed with the project; and (4) is
consensual.
“FREELY – GIVEN”
“Freely-given” means that potentially affected people must
freely offer their consent.  Consent must be entirely voluntary.
In other words, they must not be coerced or tricked into consent. 
“FULLY – INFORMED”
“Fully-informed” means the affected people know and
understand as much about their own rights and the implication
of the proposed project as do the proponents, so that both sides
can negotiate with equality of information.  This requires two
categories of information.
First, the weaker and more vulnerable of the two sides must
understand their rights, specifically historic territorial rights:  their
rights to lands on which they have been living for generations,
and their rights of access to the natural resources on which they
depend, such as fish in the nearby river.  Indigenous peoples have
the right to self-determine the course and pace of their own devel-
opment.  As a result, facilitating the process of consent is usually
best done by neutral agents.  This may preclude the WBG from
acting as the facilitator for a consensual process, as it usually has
a vested interest in the positions of governments and corporations
as much as in the rights of potentially affected peoples.9
The second category of information concerns the nature of
the project being contemplated by the proponent. Affected people
must understand the potential harm and risks that they might
accrue if they accepted the project. Worst-case scenarios and
potential disasters need to be understood.  In the experience of
many indigenous peoples, rivers do not die.  It may be beyond
their imagination for a river to die.  However, an industry can eas-
ily kill a river.  The possible death of a river, the sterilization of an
area of ocean, or the irreversible removal of a tract of forest is not
easy for many indigenous peoples to imagine.  In the experience
of many indigenous groups, even the damage from a rare and dev-
astating forest fire is not irreversible.  Regeneration restores many
resource needs after as few as five or ten years.  Showing a car-
toon or video film of a similar project or accident elsewhere can-
not be assumed to sufficiently bring affected people up to speed
for the “fully informed” comprehension criterion.
It is also not possible to obtain consent if the people
involved have never seen an example of the project proposed.  It
does no good asking peoples’ views on a gold mine if they do
not know what a gold mine is.  Similarly, even if the people have
seen a country road, it is not legitimate to ask them to imagine
a proposed highway.  If a person is asked about the acceptabili-
ty of a reservoir – “like the farm pond you know well, only thou-
sands of times bigger” – imagination will not provide an ade-
quate basis for a valid response.
In the case of Ontario, the government thought it impossi-
ble to reach fully-informed consent on their proposal to con-
struct new nuclear power plants.  The government therefore
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IMPLEMENTING FPIC IN THE
WORLD BANK GROUP
FPIC is still not always accepted as a requirement for
development projects:
(a) In 2000, the World Commission on Dams
(“WCD”) called for FPIC to be applied for
indigenous peoples involved in dam projects.6
WCD amplified adjudication procedures and
did not mention veto power. WCD’s recom-
mendation was rejected by the WBG. 
(b) A call for FPIC for non-indigenous peoples to
be included in the 2001 revision of the WBG’s
involuntary resettlement policy was similarly
rejected by the WBG. 
(c) In February 2003, the WBG announced its
“high risk/high reward” policy of resuming
finance for big infrastructure projects and a new
water strategy paper emphasizing big dams,
after a decade-long suspension. Civil Society
responded with “Gambling with Peoples’
Lives: What the World Bank’s New ‘High
Risk/High Reward’ Strategy Means for the
Poor and the Environment”7, urging the WBG
to adopt FPIC. 
(d) Nevertheless, FPIC is sought these days in
some WBG projects, though it is not yet clear-
ly mandated by WBG policies.8
financed a learning experience that would enable potentially
affected people to understand the questions that would in the
future be asked of them.  Such “intervener financing” is now
commonplace. Intervenor financing augments the affected com-
munity’s capacity to design studies, ask the right questions, and
assimilate the results – all before deciding on FPIC. 
In the case of dams, for instance, people are bussed to the
nearest dam so they can understand what a reservoir is like and
spend some days talking in detail with the people previously
impacted by a relatively old project.  Explaining what a project
will be like is not easy.  While scale models, videos, maps, dia-
grams, and photographs may help, they are unlikely to suffice.
The affected people, or their representatives, need to visit simi-
lar projects and talk with people who have been through similar
impacts firsthand. “Fully-informed” is the means to equality of
negotiation.  Many societies require building reciprocal rela-
tionships before negotiations can legitimately begin. Incomplete
information means the people’s lack of information is being
exploited by the proponent.
“PRIOR”
“Prior” means consent has to be obtained before permission
is granted to the proponent to proceed with the proposed project
that will affect the communities.  This must occur well before a
financing agency considers the request to finance the project.
Consent is best achieved as part of the Environmental
Assessment / Social Assessment (“EA/SA”) process: the impacts
are predicted together and mitigation is also designed together.
“CONSENT”
“Consent” means harmonious, voluntary agreement with
the measures designed to make the proposed project acceptable
to the potentially affected communities.  FPIC does not demand
absolute consensus; a significant majority suffices.  A majority
of 51% suffices in democratic elections, which may be used as
a guide to the definition of a “significant majority”.  
There are many mechanisms for achieving consent,
although they may be called by different terms. Plebiscites
(direct single issue votes) and referenda (votes on a proposal or
subsequent endorsement of an agreement reached by leaders or
a legislative body) are two mechanisms used on occasion. For
instance, should your nation join the European Union, or shall
we permit Wal-Mart to build in our community?  Some munic-
ipalities might also mandate referenda on assuming debt before
issuing bonds for a new thruway.  If there is substantial opposi-
tion to the proposed project, consent becomes less achievable.
Although there are no hard and fast rules about the fraction of
the community that must agree, the point is usually less impor-
tant than it first appears.  Most relevant societies discuss impor-
tant issues together as a community, with leaders or representa-
tives, and often for days on end, until the spirit of consensus is
reached.  The New York Stock Exchange was created through
long negotiations by 24 brokers pow-wowing in the shade of a
Buttonwood Tree on Wall Street, Manhattan, on 17 May 1792;
hence the “Buttonwood Agreement”.  In Botswana, such ind-
abas or parleys commonly last for several days.
The bottom line of FPIC is that the affected communities
must understand that they will benefit from the proposed proj-
ect, and that these specific benefits will far exceed any worst-
case scenario of unforeseen impacts.  Affected communities
must become convinced that prudent mechanisms are in place to
guarantee their benefits, compensation will be just, and rehabil-
itation will ensure the communities are clearly better off with
the project.  In addition, affected people must understand that
they will be fully involved in legally enforceable monitoring to
ensure compliance with whatever they are consenting.
WHO APPROPRIATELY REPRESENTS
A COMMUNITY?
Many societies are not homogeneous entities with shared
values and norms.  Communities tend to differentiate and frag-
ment.  Many societies function with chosen leaders, but may
also include competing individuals and factions. The chosen
representatives may have different abilities to assert the views of
the community.  In such situations, it is essential that truly legit-
imate representatives be sought and involved in FPIC, rather
than the usual easier-to-identify village elites.  Most representa-
tives discuss the current issue being negotiated in detail with the
larger group in order to seek ratification (or rejection) of a sta-
tus.  
Because it has been common practice for proponents to
latch onto a certain representative and deal only with them from
the outset, great care must be exercised that the representatives
retain broad legitimacy throughout the process.  The FPIC
process can be manipulated.  Proponent selection or acceptance
of a representative tends to increase fragmentation. 
From the representatives’ side, their task is not easy, even
assuming they have the best interests of their own society as
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CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS, FPIC, AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
When Canada wanted to extract hydrocarbons from
the Yukon and Mackenzie Valley territories of Canada’s
Indigenous People, or “First Nation”, the 1974-1977
Royal Commission headed by Supreme Court Judge
Thomas R. Berger agreed with the First Nations’ rejection
of the project because the likely impacts looked too severe,
the offered benefits too meager, and the promises aspira-
tional.  Since then, political evolution and forceful legisla-
tion have improved protection for the First Nations and
strengthened their bargaining power, in part by devolving
control from Ottawa to the First Nations. The First Nations
now have some ownership rights over both surface and
sub-surface resources.  In 2001, most of the potentially
impacted First Nations negotiated a financial stake in the
pipeline: oil corporations and First Nation now have
become partners, and it looks as if the First Nation will
provide consent.  Pipeline planning began in earnest in
2003. Apparently, the 30-year delay has been justified.
their topmost priority.  Negotiations may change over the years,
so it will not be easy for the representative to know whether to
insist that 20% of the royalties devolve to the affected commu-
nities, or whether to hold out for 50%, or more.
NEGOTIATION FOR FPIC
Consent revolves around negotiation, which can work only
when the two negotiating parties have the same information and
are not overly unbalanced in power.  It can be very difficult for the
weaker partner to negotiate, partly because the playing field shifts
every year, the price of the product sought by the proponent may
fluctuate, and the rules and laws governing development and
human rights change through the years.  Some nations use refer-
enda in such cases, especially when a municipality would take on
the future debt.  If a municipality wants to widen a road or build
a new school, it needs consent before issuing bonds.  
Eminent domain cannot be applied widely to villages or
communities. Where consent has been obtained properly from
all potentially impacted communities, one or two holdouts
against the consent of the community could possibly be circum-
vented through eminent domain, but even then, compensation
combined with development benefits for the affected families
would have to be fair and just.  
Potentially affected people organize themselves to compre-
hend their rights and the potential risks of the proposal, and have
to be able to negotiate an “Impacts and Benefits Agreement”.  In
other words, the affected communities must be able to balance
potential risks or costs on the one hand, with what is being
offered by the proponent or sought by the community on the
other hand.  Labor unions often have a role in empowering the
poor to improve the benefit/impact ratio.
There is little “best practice” precedent on which to base
negotiations.  Some local impacted communities receive no roy-
alties.  A community might receive 20% of royalties, but this
might then be deducted from what the central government pre-
viously allocated to that community, making the net benefit fall
back to zero.  Some impacted communities seek 100% of royal-
ties for resources extracted from their lands.  In the Chad-
Cameroon oil pipeline case, 5% of royalties were allocated to
the oil-producing region.  If the detailed, written terms of the
negotiation process are widely acceptable to the potentially
affected people, consent has been achieved.  FPIC is earned
when there is demonstrable public acceptance of the transpar-
ently negotiated agreement.
HOW MANY FPICS SUFFICE?
Is FPIC perpetual or can FPIC be revoked when necessary?
It may not be clear whether FPIC is a once-off landmark, never
to be rescinded, or if it has to be renewed annually, with every
significant change in the project status, or with changes in the
affected society.  
For instance, Peru’s Yanacocha gold mine, the second
largest in the world, was financed by IFC in 1993 with little or
no consultation and refusal to recognize that many of the affect-
ed people are indigenous. The first La Quinoa expansion in 2000
led to civil unrest and police brutality as the affected people had
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FPIC FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, NOT JUST
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
FPIC was accepted earlier for indigenous peoples
than for non-indigenous communities.  The rationale for
this is the belief that indigenous peoples’ livelihood and
culture are more dependent on their relationship to cus-
tomary lands.  Hence, indigenous peoples are more likely
to suffer from displacement than non-indigenous commu-
nities.  It is true that indigenous peoples are indeed more
dependent on customary resources than many other com-
munities.  There is a continuum of dependence on cus-
tomary resources, with indigenous peoples clustered at
one end, peasants and the rural poor in between, and the
urban poor less connected.  Proneness to suffering (or
worse) if displaced or severely impacted is certainly one
criterion for consent.  But the other criterion is inclusion,
freedom to choose one’s fate, meaningful participation in
decisions affecting one’s community; in short, democra-
cy.  Why is it that the rural poor can be displaced against
their will, but other peoples cannot?  Can development
have a double standard and advocate democracy for some,
but autocracy for the rest?  FPIC should be applied to all
communities, certainly for indigenous peoples, but also
the poor in general.
IFC’S ALLAIN & DUHANGAN
HYDROPROJECT
Himachal Pradesh, India
The International Financial Corporation (“IFC”), a
part of the WBG, and the Hydroproject’s proponent were
accused on 13 Nov 2003 of “unduly pressurizing” the
affected communities, which had rejected the
Environmental Resources and Management
Corporation’s environmental and social assessment of this
$192 million, 192 MW project as totally unacceptable.
The affected people claimed they were not at all
informed, much less consulted.  The IFC refused to trans-
late the EA/SA into Hindi in February 2004.  The
Hydroproject’s standard requirement of a “No-Objection
Certificate” would not suffice for FPIC.10 The affected
communities insist on an independent panel and public
hearings (after they have read a Hindi EA/SA report).
The results of the hearings are to be public documents and
should go to IFC’s board along with other documentation
before their decision.11
started to suffer from polluted water, mercury toxicity and
cyanide-related acidity.  IFC claimed that FPIC was not needed
for the second expansion on Mount Quilish.  The Newmont
Mining Corporation claimed to have already reached FPIC, but
nearly all of the surrounding communities are protesting the sec-
ond stage of expansion.  The Mayor of nearby Cajamarca
opposes the Quilish stage, and one poll showed more than 60%
of people also oppose it.  By the time the expansion was being
planned, the people had been so severely impacted by the first
few years of operation that they passed an ordinance in 2002
legally protecting the sacred mountain, a major source of water.
Newmont Mining is appealing the ordinance.  In such a case, a
second FPIC should be sought.
IFC also claimed to have achieved FPIC in the case of Laos’s
Sepon gold and copper mine discovered by Rio Tinto Zinc, Inc.
(“RTZ”) in 1995, but no Laotian had ever seen a gold mine, so it
is unclear how well-informed the affected people actually were.
In 2001, Oxfam International sent a governmental environmental
official to the Philippines to see a similar gold operation. 
THE WBG, FPIC, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
FPIC is a more participatory approach to resource alloca-
tion, because it helps to democratize natural resource-led devel-
opment.12 On the continuum between the poles of democracy
and autocracy, consent lies at the democratic pole, while invol-
untary displacement is at the autocratic pole.  As an economic
organization, the WBG should remember that economics works
only under voluntary circumstances, and does not work under
coercive circumstances.
THE WORLD BANK GROUP’S POLICY ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
Adopting relevant and widely agreed labor principles (e.g.,
those of the ILO) seems preferable to the WBG’s current case-
by-case ad hoc approach.  A first step would be to adopt ILO’s
“Core Labor Standards”.  The WBG’s decade of tergiversation
on whether to adopt the core labor standards against slavery and
extreme forms of child labor13 is not reassuring.  If a client
country denies its citizenry the rights of association and collec-
tive bargaining, the WBG must question if it needs to be more
persuasive and proactive and more of a leader, rather than just
accepting such denials.  
The WBG’s Chief Economist has written that the principle
of equality underlies poverty reduction:  human rights principles
involve equality, or equal value of individuals in society, or
equality of opportunity.14 It is difficult for the WBG to admit
that poverty reduction via the trickle-down theory has been too
indirect, slow, and inefficient.  However, in 2000, the WBG
committed to the Millennium Development Goals, which
includes direct poverty reduction.
Critics often claim that the WBG’s posture on human
rights lags behind that of the rest of the UN family, and also
behind industry leaders.  According to the World Bank’s 2002
Development and Human Rights, more than 190 countries have
ratified the six main human rights conventions; the WBG has
not15.  In the past, the WBG has emphasized that its articles pro-
hibit use of non-economic criteria in lending; hence human
rights, it is claimed, should not be used in lending decisions.   
THE WBG’S CAUTIOUS PROGRESSION INTO
HUMAN RIGHTS
The WBG is progressing to cautious engagement in a few
specific areas of human rights.  As long ago as 1982, the WBG
adopted its official policy on indigenous peoples16, which is
essentially a human rights rather than an economic policy.  The
World Bank’s (“WB”) General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, start-
ed publishing statements dealing with human rights issues in
1988.  In 1993, he wrote that “balanced development can only
be achieved if the basic human rights are secured for persons
affected by development”17 (henceforth referred to as
“Shihata’s Threshold”).
The WBG still distinguishes between economic well-being,
which is the focus of its efforts, and political rights, which are
said to fall outside the WBG’s legitimate scope.  On the other
hand is the view enunciated by noted economist Amartya Sen in
a speech to the WBG in 2002:  “Political rights . . . are not only
pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs, they are
also central to the conceptualization of economic needs them-
selves.”18 Economics has a creditable history of attending to
social justice, equality, and human rights dating back to John
Stuart Mill and John Rawls.
70SUMMER 2004 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FPIC IN
THE WORLD BANK GROUP
1. Economic development should not rely on
force. Coercion means people are being
excluded and are forced to subsidize the
developer.
2. The WBG should mandate FPIC for all oper-
ations (e.g., displacement) involving indige-
nous and non-indigenous peoples, and all
projects impacting communities.
3. The WBG should strengthen its policies on
consultation, participation, disclosure and
transparency so that FPIC is the main criteri-
on to be used as a social license to operate,
hence as the WBG’s main tool in deciding
whether to support the operation once FPIC
has been legitimately obtained.
4. As genuine consensus is difficult and time
consuming to obtain, it is best sought by rep-
utable objective and independent agents,
rather than either by the proponent, the gov-
ernment, or the WBG.
5. The WBG should clarify the conditions under
which eminent domain is permissible.
The WBG’s first paper on human rights (1998) generally
accepted property rights and participation rights, but failed to
state that the WBG had an obligation to respect human rights.
However, it did state that the WBG believes that creating the con-
ditions for the attainment of human rights is the central and irre-
ducible goal of development.  Since then, the WBG has increas-
ingly alluded to human rights, and in three specific instances,
egregious violations have been commendably acted upon19.  
ADOPTION OF ILO CORE PRINCIPLES
The WBG’s policies prohibit it from supporting actions that
violate conventions ratified by a member country.  Although rat-
ification of conventions is open only to sovereign nations, the
WBG can support client countries in their application of con-
ventions they have ratified.  Since 1988, ILO has made enforce-
ment of its eight core conventions a condition of ILO member-
ship.  They are applicable whether or not the country has ratified
them.  The WB is  aware of ILO’s conventions, but it has made
a determination (more than once) that it would not adopt or
apply any of them.  Nevertheless, IFC started applying two of
ILO’s core principles against slavery and extreme forms of child
labor in 1997 to all IFC and Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (‘MIGA”) investments.20
At the 2000 IMF/WBG Annual Meetings in Prague, WBG
President Wolfensohn promised to grapple with human rights
issues.  In May 2002, he asked staff to draft a Human Rights
Strategy21 without overstepping the WBG’s mandate or com-
promising “our advantage of political neutrality”.  While he stat-
ed that the WB supports the promotion of all four core labor
standards, the institution does not apply conditionality on these
standards in its lending.  Promotion of the standards is better
than none, but some critics have argued that refusing to uphold
the standards as conditions for loans undermines their imple-
mentation.  In fact, the WBG sometimes recommends violation
of these standards22. 
The World Bank’s 1995 World Development Report on
labor is generally positive about trade unions, but emphasizes
that “low cost labor is the main comparative advantage of poor
countries.” The International Development Association’s
(“IDA”) Replenishments 12 (in 1999) and 13 (in 2002) pushed
the reluctant WBG by mandating an assessment of core labor
standards in some Country Assistance Strategies, which has
started in a few select IDA countries.  However, WBG’s rheto-
ric on corporate social responsibility, including ILO’s core labor
standards and corporate codes of conduct, is largely still aspira-
tional.  While ILO’s core standards are slowly being considered,
in practice they are commonly overridden to enhance labor mar-
ket flexibility, reduce labor costs, or to act in an industry friend-
ly manner.  
Reconsidering whether to do business in countries with
gross human rights violations is not yet systematic in the WBG.
However, the WBG’s reinvigorated priority of reducing poverty
directly involves the advancement of human rights.  A key ques-
tion is the extent to which the WBG continues supporting gov-
ernments systematically abusing human rights and with little
commitment to reducing poverty.  
CURRENT STATUS AT THE WORLD BANK
“SHIHATA’S THRESHOLD” – DETERMINING WHERE TO
DRAW THE LINE
The Bank’s Human Rights Strategy promised by President
Wolfensohn four years ago is not yet available.  The situation
currently seems to be that if and when the WBG judges that
human rights violations have started to affect economic devel-
opment, WBG staff will then be permitted to address such
issues.  The WBG has been criticized for financially supporting
Suharto’s Indonesia, Mobutu’s Zaire, Marcos’ Philippines, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  That there was a strug-
gle for the WBG to cease lending to apartheid South Africa24
suggests that finding the threshold at which human rights start to
influence economic development is not easy for the WBG to
specify, although pellucid for civil society.  On the other hand,
the WBG refrained from investing in Burma/Myanmar, because
allegations of slavery had became inescapable.  Had slavery
started to affect economic development, thus crossing
“Shihata’s threshold”?  At least in some places, slavery appears
to have been abolished because of the belief that it is morally
wrong.  In fact, gross social injustice often becomes morally
unacceptable long before it crosses Shihata’s threshold of influ-
encing economic development.  
Ascertaining Shihata’s threshold criterion at which human
rights abuses begin to influence economics has become more
difficult as economic wisdom has changed.  For example, the
main reason adduced by the WBG for not supporting trade
unions and collective bargaining over the last 20 years was that
they are not economic.  That abruptly changed in 2003.  The
WBG’s new survey of more than one thousand studies on the
effects of unions and collective bargaining shows that they reap
significant economic benefits.25
STEPS TAKEN
It is difficult to ascertain what the WBG is doing about
human rights; they are scarcely alluded to in the official web-site,
and there does not seem to be an identified focal point or unit. 
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THE STRUGGLE OVER AUSTRALIA’S
JABILUKA URANIUM
Uranium was discovered in 1971 on Aboriginal
lands. The miners – Energy Resources of Australia and
RTZ – claim there would be acceptable impacts on the
indigenous peoples, Kakadu National Park/UN World
Heritage Site, and posted a $30 million performance
bond. The Mirrar, another indigenous group, much of
Australian civil society, several senate investigations, and
a special UN mission disagreed.  Demonstrations, civil
disobedience, blockades and mass arrests over a period of
thirty years helped to stop mining by about 2000.  The
miners started to transport mined radioactive ore to its ori-
gin deep underground in 2003. The affected people are
expected to regain their veto power in 2004.23
• The WBG now considers that labor unions, collec-
tive bargaining and other civil liberties are “eco-
nomic”, according to WBG’s own research.26
• The International Court of Justice has ruled that the
WBG’s articles need to be interpreted in the context
of contemporary law, in which human rights are of
international concern, rather than political matters
exclusively the purview of domestic governments.
• WBG President Wolfensohn stated in 1999 that no
equitable development is possible without protec-
tion of human rights.
• A draft Human Rights Policy approach paper was
discussed by WBG Executive Directors in May
2003, but was rejected.  Industrial country represen-
tatives were positive, but developing country repre-
sentatives feared human rights could be misused as
a form of protectionism.
• IFC’s Peter Woicke raised the need for a Safeguard
Policy on Human Rights at least twice during the
2002-2004 independent Extractive Industry
Reviews.27 In addition, he published his desire for
an official new human rights safeguard policy in the
Financial Times, and again on Human Rights Day
(10 December 2003).
• Almost all WBG member countries have ratified
human rights standards in international conventions.
• The WBG’s policies prohibit it from supporting vio-
lations of member countries’ commitments to
uphold international treaties, including human rights
obligations.
• Shihata himself ruled that obligations under the UN
Charter (Article 103) prevail over the WBG’s
Articles of Agreement. 
• The World Bank’s January 2004 draft “Management
Response”28 to the independent Extractive Industry
Review did not accept its recommendations on FPIC
and human rights, nor even the two ILO Core Labor
Standards adopted by IFC in 1997.  President
Wolfensohn distanced himself from the WBG
January 2004 Management Response to the report,
and ordered a more positive re-think.  He then post-
poned the rethink until after the April 2004 Annual
Meetings, then until the summer.
• President Wolfensohn and IFC’s VP Peter Woicke
both presented supportive human rights speeches
on 1st March 2004 at the “Conference on Human
Rights and Development” in New York. Since mid-
2003, human rights focal points have been nomi-
nated in each Vice-Presidency.  Senior VP and
General Counsel Roberto Daniño, appointed
October 2003, is said to be more positive on human
rights than his predecessors. 
THE LEGITIMACY OF FREE PRIOR AND
INFORMED CONSENT
If fully-informed, potentially-affected communities reject a
proposed project, but the project proceeds over their objections,
democracy and freedoms will have been undermined.  The use
of eviction and forced displacement without consent implies
autocracy, not democracy.  This cannot be construed as a social
license to operate.  FPIC balances the national interest with
community rights.  Clearly, it would not be in the national inter-
est if an extraordinarily lucrative mine, for example, was held
hostage by one absentee family with a house on the lode.  In
such a case, eminent domain could rightly be used.  But if the
capital city sits on a big lode, the developers would not dream
of annexing the city.  Where potentially affected people are rich,
have a voice, and are numerous, projects do not go ahead.
Developers want to go ahead only when the impacted people are
poor, indigenous, or few in numbers.  In the continuum between
one family and a major city, when should eminent domain be
used, and when should consent be required?  The WBG’s para-
mount goal of poverty reduction cannot be achieved by forcing
risky projects on the poor.  FPIC protects the poor so they do not
suffer as much from impacts by the development. 
Free prior informed consent has been accepted by a dozen
UN institutions and many others in cases involving indigenous
peoples.29 FPIC does not preclude the infrequent use of emi-
nent domain in individual cases.  The World Bank Group man-
dates “meaningful consultation,” which it has interpreted to
include the right to say “no” to a proposal.  Therefore, under its
own rules, the WBG should follow FPIC, but is loath to clarify
this inconsistency.30
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1 Most economic development projects depend on shifting humans.
Displacement is traumatic, sometimes gravely so. Urban resettlement
often works because even though the oustees are removed from their
dwellings, their jobs, society and relationships remain intact.  Urban ous-
tees usually receive another house in a nearby street. Rural displacement
usually fails, thus intensifying poverty, according to all internal World
Bank examinations. This is probably the worst feature of economic
development today; it is also the only case where economic development
relies on coercion, and does not try to seek consensus. This means the
poor subsidize the proponent who externalizes resettlement costs. There
has been improvement in the means by which rural people are moved.
Forty years ago, a village may have been warned to move out of the way
in a few days. Later, the villagers were informed they would have to
move in a few months.  A decade or so later, they may have been consult-
ed to see if they would prefer to move to site A or site B.  Consultation
then progressed to the affected people being asked how and to where
they would be moved.  A decade later, participation supplanted consulta-
tion.  Potentially affected people started to participate in resettlement
planning.  The next improvement was ‘meaningful participation’, inter-
preted by Ibrahim Shihata, WBG General Counsel, to mean the village
could reject being evicted.
2 For detailed case studies showing how FPIC has been approached in the
case of mining, see S. Bass, P. S. Parikh, R. Czebiniak & M. Filbey, Prior
Informed Consent and Mining: Promoting the Sustainable Development of
Local Communities, Environmental Law Institute, 2004, available at
http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=10965 (last visited June 25,
2004).
3 There are viable, economic and proven alternatives to hydro-reservoirs
displacing many people.  Reservoirs, especially in densely populated
areas, are not necessary for water supply.  Irrigation is unfortunately
probably necessary, and some irrigation needs reservoirs.  In this sole
case, oustees must be guaranteed to become project beneficiaries and be
substantially better off with the project.  In this case, consent can be
expected.
4 See also J. Athialy, Free Prior Informed Consent of Communities in
Large Hydroprojects : The Case of the James Bay Projects (2003) (Clark
University).
5 See generally P. Bosshard, Free Prior Informed Consent: No Longer a
Question of Omelettes and Eggs, Presentation to the Berne Declaration
(March 8, 2004).  See also D. CALLIES, D. CURTIN & B. MCCUTCHEON,
BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
(Environmental Law Institute 2003).
6 DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING
(World Commission on Dams 2000), available at
http://www.dams.org/report/contents.htm (last visited June 25, 2004).
7 P.  Bosshard, J. Bruil, K. Horta, S. Lawrence, and C. Welch, Gambling
with People’s Lives: What the “High-Risk / High-Reward” Strategy
Means for the Poor and the Environment, Environmental Defense,
Friends of the Earth, International Rivers Network, 2003, available at
http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/worldbank/gambling/Gambling.pdf (last
visited June 25, 2004) [hereinafter Bosshard].
8 EXTRACTING PROMISES: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
AND THE WORLD BANK (M. Colchester, A. L. Tamayo, R. Royillas & E.
Caruso eds., Tebtebba Foundation 2003).
9 Id.
10 Bosshard, supra note 7.
11 This decision was influenced by H. Thakkur, Lessons Unlearned?  The
Case of India’s Allain Duhangan Dam and the World Bank, WORLD
RIVERS REVIEW, Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.irn.org/pubs/wrr/issues/WRR_V19_N1final.pdf (last visited
June 25, 2004).
12 K. Slack, Sharing the Riches of the Earth: Democratizing Natural
Resource-Led Development, ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Winter
2004 (Publication of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs).
13 N. Stern, Development and Human Rights, Speech delivered to the
London School of Economics (2003).  Stern made the important point
that we need to be able to distinguish between the relative importance of
different rights.  For example, the Universal Declaration gives equal
weight to free primary education as to paid holidays. Similarly, the
Declaration upholds the right of patent protection. Stern asks: “Does this
mean it is wrong to campaign for generic versions of drugs freely traded
between developing countries?”
14 Id.
15 In 1995, Ibrahim Shihata, World Bank Group General Counsel, ruled
that participation of affected people requires the two human rights, those
(a) of ‘free expression and (b) of assembly.’ He noted that the violation of
political rights, when extensive and pervasive, “could impose itself as an
issue in the Bank’s decisions.”  The Bank’s country creditworthiness risk
analyses would include major risks of human rights violations.  The Bank’s
1998 Development and Human Rights alludes to governance lending lead-
ing to a broader range of human rights.  Its Comprehensive Development
Framework mentions that human rights need to be protected.
16 The WBG’s policy on indigenous peoples, originally written by Dr.
Goodland in 1982, evolved through the years.  For example, seven years
later, ILO adopted their similar Convention 169.  The EU Council of
Ministers adopted their indigenous peoples resolution in 1998, and the
Asian Development Bank adopted essentially the same policy in 1998
(OP 7.10).  The World Commission on Dams upheld the policy in 2000.
17 Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank Legal Papers, Dordrecht Kluwer
Law (2000).  See also THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD:
SELECTED ESSAYS AND LECTURES (Ibrahim Shihata ed., World Bank 2001)
18 Amartya Sen, Presentation to the World Bank (2002).
19 (a) Allegations of slavery on Myanmar’s Yadana gas pipeline in 2000
led the WBG to drop the largest Thai electrical generation component the
day before Board presentation.  (b) WBG President Wolfensohn personal-
ly interceded against gross mistreatment of critics of the Chad-Cameroon
oil pipeline, managing to spring the leader of the opposition, Ngarlejy
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(b) collective bargaining, (c) forced labor, (d) discrimination, (e) minimum
age and (f) child labor.  The UN’s treaty on women’s rights has been rati-
fied by 170 nations over the last 23 years.  The International Court of
Justice ruled that violation of human rights is a breach of the state’s obli-
gations to the international community as long ago as 1971.
21 President Wolfensohn invited Mary Robinson, then UN High
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Commissioner on Human Rights, to present a major speech on Human
Rights to WBG officials in 2001, and commemorated the anniversary of
the UN Human Rights Convention by publishing a collection of essays
related to human rights.
22 For example, in Argentina in 1999-2000, the WB urged that the Labor
Code restrict collective bargaining.  In Croatia in 2000, the WB urged the
government to annul negotiated collective agreements and decree wage
reductions. Pakistan in 2001: the CAS for Pakistan supported annulling
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agreements.  When union organizers were fired in 2002 in the WBG-sup-
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2003, available at http://www.eireview.org/html/EIRFinalReport.html
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28 Management Response to the Independent Extractive Industry Review,
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